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Circuit that summarily concludes, with no discussion of the facts or relevant law, that the "right to record police activities on public property was not clearly established in this circuit at the time of the alleged conduct. Szymecki v. Houck, F. Such unpublished opinions "have no precedential force," Merrimac Paper Co. Harrison In re Merrimac Paper Co. King, F. The second case appellants cite is a Third Circuit opinion finding the right to film not clearly established in the context of a traffic stop, characterized as an "inherently dangerous situation.
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, F. See Newman v. Massachusetts, F. The existence of a Fourth Amendment violation on the facts alleged here turns on a question of Massachusetts law. Guevara, F. Town of Sandown, F. DeFillippo, U. Laws ch. As the Supreme Judicial Court has noted, this statute sweeps more broadly than comparable laws in other jurisdictions, in that its prohibition is not restricted to the recording of communications that are made with a reasonable expectation of privacy.
See Commonwealth v. Hyde, N. In Hyde, the defendant argued that the wiretap statute did not apply to his taping of police officers, as those "police officers did not possess any privacy interest in the words they spoke" in their interactions with the defendant. The court rejected the argument, noting that the statute requires no reasonable expectation of privacy, and held that the prohibition of secret recordings squarely applies to "recordings of police officers or other public officials interacting with members of the public.
The relevant question, then, is whether, on the facts alleged in the complaint, Glik "secretly" videotaped the appellant officers. Commonwealth v. Jackson, N. Ennis, N. Thus, in Hyde, where the defendant was convicted of a wiretap violation for secretly recording a traffic stop, the Supreme Judicial Court explained that "the recording would not have been secret" within the meaning of the statute if the defendant had simply "held the tape recorder in plain sight.
Jackson, is that The unmistakable logic of Hyde, building on the secrecy inquiry turns on notice, i. Rivera, N. There, a criminal defendant argued for suppression under the wiretap statute of an audio recording by a convenience store security camera, on the theory that he lacked actual knowledge that the security cameras recorded audio as well as video. The complaint alleges that Glik "openly record[ed] the police officers" with his cell phone, and further that "the police officers admitted Mr.
Glik was publicly and openly recording them. See Jackson, N. Moreover, not only does Hyde along with the Rivera concurrences indicate that the use of a recording device in "plain sight," as here, constitutes adequate objective evidence of actual knowledge of the recording, but here the police officers made clear through their conduct that they knew Glik was recording them.
They note that a cell phone, unlike the tape recorder used in Hyde, has numerous discrete functions, such as text messaging, internet browsing, video gaming, and photography, and thus the fact of an individual holding out a cell phone in front of his body is of indeterminate significance.
See N. Simply put, a straightforward reading of the statute and case law cannot support the suggestion that a recording made with a device known to record audio and held in plain view is "secret. They point out, rightly, that a lesser showing is required for an officer to be entitled to qualified immunity from a Fourth Amendment claim based on a warrantless arrest than to establish probable cause.
See Cox v. Hainey, F. Officers are entitled to qualified immunity "so long as the presence of probable cause is at least arguable. Urso, F. Watkins, F. The presence of probable cause was not even arguable here. The allegations of the complaint establish that Glik was openly recording the police officers and that they were aware of his surveillance. For the reasons we have discussed, we see no basis in the law for a reasonable officer to conclude that such a conspicuous act of recording was "secret" merely because the officer did not have actual knowledge of whether audio was being recorded.
Ian D. Glik then brought this suit under 42 U. We conclude, based on the facts alleged, that Glik was exercising clearly- established First Amendment rights in filming the officers in a public space, and that his clearly-established Fourth Amendment rights were violated by his arrest without probable cause. We therefore affirm. Flores Galarza, F.
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Felmaran I want to make my parents happy and proud of me. The problem is that voices were or could have been recorded. Create a free website or blog at WordPress. Read the entire New York Times article here. January 9, at 4: US Court of Appeals decision last week. I believe that I will reopen my case and win and I also believe in the victims who are jailed for expressing their private citizen rights. Setting your white balance correctly saves time and frustration when it comes time to edit and opens up artistic options in the field.
And if so being upfront and letting people in on what you believe in, and why, seems a far more p4, honest, and libertarian approach when addressing others. It promotes civil liberties awareness and individual accountability and responsibility. Take action to support Tiawanda Moore! You are commenting using your WordPress.